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Abstract—Various methods have been proposed for creating
and maintaining lists of potentially filtered URLs to allow for
measurement of ongoing internet censorship around the world.
Whilst testing a known resource for evidence of filtering can be
relatively simple, given appropriate vantage points, discovering
previously unknown filtered web resources remains an open
challenge.
We present a new framework for automating the process of
discovering filtered resources through the use of adaptive queries
to well-known search engines. Our system applies information
retrieval algorithms to isolate characteristic linguistic patterns in
known filtered web pages; these are then used as the basis for
web search queries. The results of these queries are then checked
for evidence of filtering, and newly discovered filtered resources
are fed back into the system to detect further filtered content.
Our implementation of this framework, applied to China as a
case study, shows that this approach is demonstrably effective at
detecting significant numbers of previously unknown filtered web
pages, making a significant contribution to the ongoing detection
of internet filtering as it develops.
Our tool is currently deployed and has been used to discover
1355 domains that are poisoned within China as of Feb 2017—30
times more than are contained in the most widely-used public
filter list. Of these, 759 are outside of the Alexa Top 1000 domains
list, demonstrating the capability of this framework to find more
obscure filtered content. Further, our initial analysis of filtered
URLs, and the search terms that were used to discover them,
gives further insight into the nature of the content currently
being blocked in China.
Index Terms—censorship, filtering, DNS, Chinese Internet,
search
I. INTRODUCTION
F Iltering of web resources around the world is an everchanging and complex, technical and socio political
activity. The aims of censorship policies depend on the region
and access to the larger Internet. Advocates of free speech and
expression maintain that blocking of content is detrimental to
society and culture whereas censors believe this is a necessary
part of controlling a large population. In response, there have
been numerous attempts to discover blacklisted keywords and
URLs for countries of interest [1][2][3][4]. These approaches
vary in the techniques used and the way they can be used to
maintain these lists of filtered content. Existing approaches
are, howevre, limited in the number of filtered URLs they can
discover and maintain due to a lack of scalability.
We present FilteredWeb, a novel framework that allows
researchers and organisations to maintain lists of filtered
URLs in an automated fashion without relying on in-country
expertise, human reporting, or language specific techniques.
This approach uses existing infrastructure to find potentially
censored URLs and can be extended based on the resources
available.
We have implemented this approach as a tool, making use
of a large search engine to find potentially censored domains,
and exploiting features of the DNS blocking systems in target
countries to test if candidate domains are indeed filtered.
Experiments demonstrate that our method is effective at
discovering previously unidentified filtered URLs, and is thus a
useful tool to develop and maintain continually updated lists of
blocked URLs for testing. Furthermore, we have performed an
initial analysis on the discovered blocked content to show that
we can use this framework to collect data about the censorship
landscape in a particular country.
Our tool is designed for ongoing usage in which URL lists
are continually updated and tested to allow for changes due to
dynamic site content and shifts in filtering behaviour.
A. Contributions
Our proposed framework is a general approach for the
detection of filtered web content and can be implemented
depending on circumstance. The implementation we have built,
following the framework, is directly applicable for detecting
poisoned domains within China. Our contributions are:
• A general framework for detecting filtered URLs through
the use of existing infrastructure and services.
• An implementation of our framework, using a specific set
of services.
• A number of discovered poisoned domains and the search
terms used to find them.
• A metric to describe the effectiveness of a given base
domain’s patterns of language as a seed to discover further
filtered domains.
We now describe the key elements of our approach and
its evaluation: the nature of Internet censorship, and textual
analysis of known blocked web pages.
II. FILTERING OF THE INTERNET
There are many different approaches for filtering material
on the Internet. The use of these depends on the network
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infrastructure, aims and policy of the censor. The following
section describes three methods that are the most applicable
for the detection framework described in this paper.
A. IP Address filtering
The blocking of IP addresses is a widely known and used
method to restrict access to resources on the Internet. It is
often employed within routing devices that will halt or redirect
a connection to a blacklisted IP. Whilst simple to implement,
over-blocking is a common problem since many websites exist
on shared IPs. Furthermore, with the rise of content-delivery
networks and distributed services, the IP address for certain
internet services is not consistent and depends on location and
the state of the resource.
B. Domain Name Filtering
DNS-based filtering of the Internet is a well known approach
used in many countries around the world. By manipulating the
DNS, a censor can restrict access to sensitive content in an
effective and scalable manner. Simply put, DNS queries for
blacklisted sites can generate a range of responses [5]: an error,
an incorrect IP address or an IP address to a non-existent
server.
While open to circumvention by technically skilled users,
this approach will stop a large portion internet users within a
censored region from accessing blocked sites. The use of DNS
filtering is known to be active in a number of different countries,
such as China [6][7][8], Iran [9], and Pakistan [10][11], as
well as many others.
DNS poisoning specifically refers to a censor injecting
responses for certain DNS queries, often without interfering
with the original traffic or DNS servers [6][12][13][14]. This
is typically achieved either by a man-on-the-side or on-path
attack, in which an actor passively watches DNS requests
passing through key routing points in the network [15].
To block domains, the censor will inject incorrect or
malformed responses to queries for blacklisted domains. This
injected response will often be received by the client before
the genuine response arrives, due to the censor responding to
DNS queries as they are en route to the destination DNS server.
In most cases, the injected response will be accepted, while
the genuine one discarded—due to its arrival time after the
injected. Furthermore, it is not uncommon to find that several
injected responses are received [14].
In particular, a large percentage of DNS requests in China
are known to be routed through areas in which poisoning
occurs [6]. Crucially, it is well known that DNS queries for
blacklisted domains to random IP addresses located within the
Chinese IP range will receive a response even if the destination
is not a DNS server. Furthermore, study by Farnan et al. [14]
showed that DNS servers located in China are also themselves
being poisoned. This means that a DNS query that is not itself
intercepted will often still be responded to with an incorrect
record.
C. Keyword Filtering
The blocking of requests or responses that contain blacklisted
keywords is a more advanced form of internet filtering.
From a technical perspective, this approach requires a more
sophisticated infrastructure than other methods as TCP streams
need to be parsed and searched for censored terms. For HTTP
requests, the location of such blacklisted words often appear
in the hostname, query or body of a request [16]. Deep packet
inspection (DPI) is often used to perform this task since a censor
cannot gain enough information about the request purely from
meta-data. China is known to have many systems that perform
this task on large amounts of Internet traffic that pass through
several key routing points within their network [6].
III. HIGH LEVEL FRAMEWORK
We propose a new approach for discovering filtered URLs
within a target country. This technique uses large search
engines to link patterns of language to URLs in order to find
previously unknown filtered URLs. It would be impractical
and inefficient simply to crawl large portions of the internet; as
such, we propose a framework that uses existing infrastructure
and services that already have a broad “view” of pages and
documents on the Internet. Further, as documents are created
or updated these changes will be reflected in these services.
Previous work [17] has shown that censors have used content
analysis as a part of their censorship infrastructure, and will
block resources or traffic containing keywords deemed to be
sensitive.
A. Approach
Our approach does not aim to derive blocked keywords,
which is a separate area of study, but instead identifies terms
that are likely to be shared by web pages that discuss key
sensitive topics. Our underlying assumption is that pages that
are blocked for discussing similar topics are themselves likely
to contain similar patterns of language or key phrases
To begin the process, the system must be seeded with known
blocked URLs for a target country. For each of these, we
download the web pages and extract the text from them -
discarding any HTML code, scripts or CSS. Then we extract
descriptive tags from the body of text that will then be used
as web search queries.
a) Descriptive Tags: we use the notion of tags to
characterise small pieces of text that describe larger bodies of
content. This could be a short description of a list of individual
words. Importantly, these are not necessarily keywords that are
themselves filtered by a country, but instead linguistic patterns
that are likely to be present on blocked web pages.
The specific method for deriving tags from web pages
may vary. One key example, and the one employed in the
example implementation given here, is term frequency – inverse
document frequency (TF-IDF), which is discussed in greater
detail in IV-A.
A web search will be made for each tag and the resulting
URLs will be stored and each checked to see if they are filtered
within the target country. For each newly discovered filtered
URL, we will perform the tag extraction again to continue the
process. This framework is summarised in Figure 1.
Our approach is recursive, and thus continually uses its
results in further iterations. This results in a swift increase
in the number of discovered domains, although we would
eventually expect this growth to plateau.
Further, given the dynamic nature of both web content
and the behaviour of censors, any implemented approach
should continually re-check filtered URLs for changes. This
is something that is especially important for news sites.
Pseudocode detailing the approach is shown in Algorithm 1.
The intuition behind this approach is that filtered web pages
may contain patterns of language that can then be used to
discover new filtered URLs. Importantly, this framework does
not identify filtered keywords, but instead uses key terms (tags)
that are likely to be shared between sites discussing similar
topics.
It is important to note that this framework is modular and
can be cleanly separated into distinct parts:
• Tag extraction: the method by which descriptive tags are
derived from a body of text.
• Web search: the search engine(s) that are used to find
URLs that are related to descriptive tags.
• Filtering check: the method for checking if a given URL
is filtered in a certain country.
Given this, we can test for filtering of URLs in different
countries by different means depending on our requirements.
Furthermore, there are various existing tools and platforms
that provide functionality to test if certain web resources are
blocked in different countries. These include GreatFire.org[18],
OONI [19] and ICLab [20] among others.
Our framework is scalable since it uses openly-available and
cost effective search engine APIs in order to find new URLs.
This means that we do not need to build or maintain large
amounts of infrastructure to crawl the Internet because this
requirement is fulfilled by a search engine. Further, the more
specific we can be with our search queries, the more accurate
and targeted results we will achieve.
To test the effectiveness of this approach, we implement
this framework in a system that will use DNS as a means for
checking if URLs are filtered. This is described in Section IV.
Algorithm 1 Pseudocode sample for the framework
urlDB ⇐ new Database(seed urls)
tagDB ⇐ new Database()
isF iltered⇐ function(url)
getTagsFromWebPage⇐ function(url)
doWebSearchForTag ⇐ function(tag)
loop
for url IN urlDB do
if isF iltered(url) = TRUE then
tags⇐ getTagsFromWebPage(url)
ADD tags TO tagDB
end if
end for
for tag IN tagDB do
urls⇐ doWebSearchForTag(tag)
ADD urls TO urlDB
end for
end loop
Fig. 1. High-level overview of the recursive filtered URL search
B. Ethical Considerations
Censorship research is sensitive, and touches on a variety
of ethical concerns that we must consider.
Wright et al. [21] provides an early look at the legal and
ethical concerns of mapping censorship events. They deal
primarily with mapping where filtering is occurring and less on
the content of what is being filtered; focusing on techniques that
rely on citizen volunteers to discover and report filtered content.
Two later papers both published in 2015 broaden the scope
of this area. The first of these by Jones et al. [22] identifies
three different approaches to measuring censorship: deploying
researchers with software, deploying citizens with software,
and co-opting existing software. The second by Crandall et al.
[23] further differentiates censorship detection between direct
observation and inference using side channel experiments. All
three of these papers argue that it is important to understand the
technology and motivations behind filtering, while aiming to
reduce the ethical risk to individuals during the data gathering
phase.
Our approach is performed on pre-existing data. Instead
of collecting data ourselves using individuals or censors, our
approach uses data that has already been collected by search
engines. This technique is non-invasive and—crucially—not
focused on data gathered directly by researchers or citizen
volunteers; thus removing the risk to individuals. While Google
or Microsoft have their own set of ethical considerations—both
when initially collecting the data and when making it available
to others—ours become more subtly nuanced. Rather than look
at the individual, we must consider the ethics of performing
academic analyses of deliberately closed systems, and of using
publicly available data gathered for a specific purpose to be
used for different and arguably political purposes.
The first consideration is that the censorship we are observing
has been installed by nation states deliberately as closed
systems. They generally do not publish the details of how such
systems work, or what content they are filtering. Authorities
may argue that these systems are in place for the benefit of
their citizens, and that obscuring their details is important to
their function, or just remain silent on the subject. Is it ethical
for us to observe—and publish—data about such systems?
This is considered by the aforementioned Wright [21] but he
argues that these practices are of insight to us as researchers;
not just to help with understanding the internet, but also to
provide insight into social and political issues. Crandall et al.
[23] agree, stating that research such as this provides empirical
data on censorship around the world, and that this data may
be of use to political scientists and sociologists, and even to
the general public.
The second consideration is of using data for purposes
outside its original intent. Search companies gather data—
ostensibly—to provide search results, and—cynically—to
gather data on users and direct them to monetised content.
Is it ethical for us to use this data to infer the details of the
aforementioned closed censorship systems? Our approach relies
upon the cooperation of search engines, and access through their
API. We believe that as long as their terms of use are obeyed,
and our approach does not pose any risk to individuals, the
ethical concerns of data used for alternative means is minimal.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
To determine the effectiveness, efficiency, and validity of
our approach, we implement the framework into a tool that
can be used to find URLs that are actively filtered in China.
This system is now in active use and we have used it to build
a list of blocked domains that exceeds any currently published
list in terms of length by several orders of magnitude. The
main components for the tool are described here.
A. Tag Extraction
To isolate descriptive tags, the documents downloaded from
filtered web pages are first cleaned of any non-readable parts
including HTML code, javascript and image/binary data. The
remaining text is then tokenized, and each word weighted using
TF-IDF [24][25][26]. This results in a ranked list of words
that best characterise the content of those pages in contrast to
typical text in that language. At this time we only consider
words that contain letters from the ISO basic Latin alphabet.
1) Term Frequency - Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF):
is a statistical method of determining how important a given
word is within a document. It uses a corpus (for the given
language) to offset the frequency of a word as it appears in
the document. Essentially, the weighting for a particular term
becomes larger proportionally with the number of times it
appears in the document, offset by its frequency in the corpus.
Taking the n terms with the highest weightings can give us a
list of significant keywords that characterize the content of the
document.
According to best practice we remove the 1000 most common
English words using the google-1000-english list [27]. The
aim of this is reduce the number of tags that are too common
and would yield generic web search results although in future
implementations we can alter this to achieve a better result.
We take the top 5 tags to use for web search queries.
B. Web Searches
We used the Bing search engine that is exposed through the
Azure Cognitive Services API [28] for web search to conduct
queries for the descriptive tags. This is because we use the
sorting and relevance algorithms that search engine companies
implement to find candidate URLs for a filtering check. Web
search is a large and complicated business; most engines do
not simply rank pages based on hyperlinks, but rather current
trends and activity.
One alternative to Bing is Common Crawl – an open data
project that scrapes the web for pages. While this can give
us more control over the search process, the project does not
provide methods for processing, sorting or querying the data.
Hence why we aim to leverage the power of existing engines
in order to use the ranking algorithms to find relevant links.
Another option is Baidu, however, it is known that results
from this engine can be filtered and this will reduce the number
of filtered URLs we can find. A study by Jiang showed that
Baidu tends to drive traffic to well-known, major sites and its
results raise questions about it’s impartiality [29]. Furthermore,
Baidu will often only direct users to site with China even if
a more relevant site, given the query, exists outside of the
Chinese IP range.
C. Filtering Check
We use a simple method to check if a domain is poisoned by
the Chinese censorship infrastructure. As explained previously,
to check if a DNS query is being intercepted, one can send
it to a non-existent DNS server within China. In this case we
send DNS queries to the following eight IP addresses located
within China – none of which are DNS servers:
• 220.181.57.217
• 223.96.100.100
• 1.24.10.10
• 202.143.16.100
• 180.160.10.1
• 180.77.100.200
• 144.0.111.90
• 42.101.0.1
If a response is received to a query, this is indicative of
filtering activity as the response would have originated from
the filtering infrastructure: the query was intercepted and a
poisoned result returned. If we receive a response to a query,
we therefore mark the domain as filtered. If a response is not
received after a given timeout, the filtering infrastructure was
not triggered, and thus the domain is not marked as filtered.
D. Parameters
To summarise, an overview of the parameters for the system;
we use:
• The top 5 descriptive tags from each filtered web page.
TABLE I
DISCOVERED FILTERED URLS AS OF FEB 2017
Counts
Unique URLs Crawled 1,113,653
Unique Domains Crawled 329,575
Unique Filtered URLs 115,337
Unique Poisoned domains 1355
Filtered URLs / 1000 URLs crawled 103.57
Poisoned domains / 1000 domains crawled 4.11
• The top 50 search result URLs from each web search.
• A DNS poisoning check to determine if URLs are filtered.
V. ANALYSIS OF APPROACH
We initialised our tool with URLs taken from the Citizen
Lab’s URL test list [30] for China. Out of the 204 URLs
present in the list, we find that 44 of the domains are DNS
poisoned as of Feb 2017 and these were used to seed the
system.
A. Results
Over 54,000 web searches we found 1355 poisoned domains
with 115,337 filtered URLs in China. In total, our system
crawled 1,113,653 unique URLs and 329,575 domains. The
spread of domains to filtered URLs varies greatly and is
discussed in Section V-C and shown in Figure 4. In short,
95% of all the filtered URLs found were from just 15 (large)
domains.
Table I depicts the number of filtered URLs and domains
that were discovered and the hit-rate of the tool where we
calculate the number of filtered domains discovered per 1000
URLs crawled.
It is important to note that when counting filtered domains,
that each domain and sub-domain is counted separately as they
may have different DNS entries. Furthermore, we have counted
all Tumblr pages as a single result due to the fact that there
seems to be a blanket block on all sub-domains (Tumblr works
by giving each of it’s users a sub-domain for their pages).
For further analysis, we categorised all of the discovered
filtered domains to understand the nature of sites that are
currently being blocked. This was done using the WebShrinker
Categories API [31], a service that indexes URLs and classifies
them into categories. These results are shown in Figure 2.
B. Discussion of Results
Our testing has demonstrated that the framework we propose
is able to discover a significant number of filtered URLs that
were not present in initial seed lists. These results indicate
that there is an exploitable connection between the content
of individual filtered web pages and other filtered domains.
Further, existing search engines can demonstrably be used as
tools to uncover censored material on a large, automated scale.
We plan to release a list of the poisoned domains discovered;
however, due to space limitations, we cannot reproduce it in
this paper.
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Fig. 2. Category Breakdown for Poisoned Domains
Note: some domains appear in more than one category
An advantage of this approach is that only filtered URLs are
used as the basis of linguistic patterns for search requests. This
increases the efficiency of the tool and prevents unnecessary
crawling of large portions of the Internet to discover newly-
filtered URLs.
The system has discovered a large number of domains that
are currently being filtered in China. The hit rate shows that the
tool has to crawl about 1000 URLs to find 4 poisoned domains.
In this instance, this approach could have been optimised
by limiting the crawling to domains that were not already
stored in the database. For this initial test however, it was
necessary to crawl larger numbers of pages in order to fully
test the usefulness of the framework. In a future version, these
optimisations could increase the efficiency and reduce the cost
of further discovery. Furthermore, we could start to reduce the
crawls of larger more well known sites - such as facebook.com
and twitter.com. This would lower the total number of URLs
crawled by a substantial amount, however, it is not clear if these
social media services actually benefit the system by providing
very new and constantly changing content – further studies
into these mechanics is a potential avenue for future research.
In comparison to lists available via the Citizen Lab – shown
in Table II, we have found a great deal more filtered URLs.
Given our tool checks for DNS poisoning, we can have a high
confidence in the numbers of blocked web pages we have
found. Moreover, our list is continually updated and growing.
Our tool is recursive, this means we can monitor the number
of filtered domains it discovers over time. This metric is useful
in determining the effectiveness of the approach since we can
compare the number of domains crawled against the number
of filtered domains found. Figure 3a shows the number of
poisoned domains discovered over time, or each loop of the
system; from this we can see that the discovery rate is relatively
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TABLE II
COMPARISON WITH ALTERNATIVE FILTERED URL LISTS FOR CHINA
FilteredWeb Citizen Lab CensMon
Filtered URLs 115,337 204 N/A
Poisoned Domains 1355 44 176
Filtered URLs - Top 1000
Removed
4153 166 N/A
Poisoned Domains - Top 1000
Removed
759 34 N/A
The list of censored domains discovered by CensMon is not publicly available,
therefore we only have the number reported.
constant. Figure 3b shows the number of discovered poisoned
domains against the number of URLs crawled.
From the categories of the poisoned domains, shown in
Figure 2, we find there are a large number of business focused
sites, which are domains used for the sale of services and
products. Further, there seems to be a substantial effort to
block domains for educational sites and services as well as
entertainment, filtering avoidance and news. This appears to
be in line with work published by King et al. [32] that posits
that the Chinese government aims to reduce collective action
potential rather than individuals. Moreover, King et al. provide
evidence showing that censors in China is not particularly harsh
towards critique of the censorship policies themselves.
C. Further Analysis
Analysing the database of URLs collected by our tool
revealed a number of interesting artifacts about its operation,
and thus the state of censorship in China. Firstly, we look at
the most commonly occurring domains that we crawl, from
this we can see the larger and better known sites and social
media services make up a large portion of the URLs we have
processed. Approximately 95% of the filtered URLs we find
are from only 15 domains – these are shown in Figure 4.
Due to the fact that domains within the Alexa Top 1000
are the most regularly occurring within our database, we have
produced Figure 5 that shows the 50 most common poisoned
domains outside of the Top 1000. These domains appear far
less frequently in web search results, but importantly, they can
give us a deeper insight into what the Chinese government is
currently blocking.
An interesting use of the collection of descriptive tags is that
we can search for them ex post facto on each of the filtered
URLs discovered. From this we can see which tags feature
most prominently in poisoned domains within China. This is by
no means a search for necessarily blocked keywords, however,
it could be used as a method to find patterns of language or
topics that may have caused a page or domain to be blocked.
Figure 6 shows the top 75 descriptive tags across all the filtered
URLs in our database after removed the Alexa Top 10001.
D. Discovery Power
The basic assumption of our approach is that filtered web
pages contain linguistic patterns that could lead to further
filtered URLs. Our framework achieves this by deriving
descriptive tags from a base URL which are used as search
queries to link to other URLs—where the tag is the connection.
To convey how strongly certain domains provide descriptive
tags that lead to the discovery of other filtered material, we
introduce a metric: discovery power. This represents the number
of filtered URLs from different domains that are found by
searching with tags isolated from a given base domain. We
calculate the discovery power by looking at the tags that, when
used as search queries, result in the discovery of at least one
other poisoned domain. (We do not count instances within the
search results where the discovered domain is the same as the
base domain—that is to say we don’t count self-discovery.)
Comparing the discovery power with the number of crawled
URLs for each domain provides insight into how much
potentially sensitive language is present on those domains.
This is not only interesting in the understanding of censorship
activity, but also to optimise our tool to consider only higher
1We do this because we found that many of the top 1000 have similar and
generic language, we are more interested in the subtler and potentially more
sensitive language.
010000
20000
30000
reuters.com archive.org wattpad.com dailymotion.com wsj.com flickr.com vimeo.com bloomberg.com soundcloud.com nytimes.com google.com instagram.com twitter.com youtube.com facebook.com
 
Fi
lte
re
d 
UR
Ls
Fig. 4. 15 Most Frequently Occurring Poisoned Domains
0
100
200
300
ov
er
pla
y.n
et
st
ar
tp
ag
e.
co
m
th
ee
po
ch
tim
es
.
co
m
am
ne
st
y.o
rg
fre
em
us
ica
rc
hi
ve
.
or
g
m
p3
−ju
ice
s.c
om
isl
am
ho
us
e.
co
m
ixq
uic
k.c
om
m
in
gh
ui.
or
g
pa
no
ra
m
io.
co
m
sp
ea
ke
rd
ec
k.c
om rfi
.fr
uy
gh
ur
co
ng
re
ss
.
or
g
pr
iva
te
in
te
rn
et
ac
ce
ss
.
co
m
w
w
w
.g
oo
gle
.
de
ha
ru
ny
ah
ya
.c
om
w
w
w
.u
yg
hu
r.k
im
pa
lta
lk.
co
m
w
en
xu
ec
ity
.co
m
ici
j.o
rg
op
en
de
m
oc
ra
cy
.n
et
ap
ps
po
t.c
om
hi
de
m
ya
ss
.
co
m
ch
an
ne
lm
et
er
.
co
m
el
tu
bo
ad
ve
nt
ist
a.
co
m
ap
kp
ur
e.
co
m
w
w
w
.g
oo
gle
.
ca
gu
m
ro
ad
.co
m
to
pt
wi
tte
r.c
om
to
rp
ro
jec
t.o
rg
be
stv
pn
.co
m
ea
st
tu
rk
ist
an
in
fo.
co
m
uh
rp
.
or
g
w
w
w
.b
lo
glo
vin
.c
om
ps
3y
ou
tu
be
.
co
m
hu
lks
ha
re
.
co
m
lyr
ics
−y
ou
tu
be
.
co
m
tw
itt
er
co
un
te
r.c
om
vid
.m
e
dw
.co
m
ch
an
ge
.
or
g
w
iki
m
ap
ia.
or
g
tw
ie
nd
s.c
om
uy
gh
ur
am
er
ica
n.
or
g
viy
ou
tu
be
.
co
m
ko
bo
.
co
m
hr
w.
or
g
tw
itp
ic.
co
m
st
or
ify
.co
m
co
ur
se
he
ro
.
co
m
 
Fi
lte
re
d 
UR
Ls
Fig. 5. 50 Most Frequently Occurring Poisoned Domains with Alexa Top 1000 Removed
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
pla
yli
sts
ha
ck
er
s
sh
er
qiy
w
et
en le
ak
an
al
yti
cs
bo
lup
uk
ra
in
ia
n
tib
et
an
un
in
g
bo
lgh
an
da
lai
rk
iye
tre
nd
ing
de
fe
nd
s
ob
am
a
ar
en
bu
rm
a
ha
n
ilh
am
w
ha
ts
ap
p
de
te
nt
ion
ha
us
a
ta
rg
et
ing
an
on
ym
ity
uy
gh
ur
s
rk
ist
an
ac
tiv
ist
la
m
a
cr
ea
to
rs
uy
gh
ur
la
r
ac
tiv
at
e
tu
rk
ist
an
to
ht
i
re
fu
ge
e
l2
tp
pr
ot
es
ts
xin
jia
ng
xe
w
er
le
r
ex
ile
bil
en
de
ta
ine
d
an
on
ym
ou
sly
pin
te
re
st
ab
us
es
tib
et
hi
nd
i
ipa
d to
r
po
lsk
i
un
blo
ck
blu
rre
d
pp
tp
dm
ca
in
te
nt
io
na
lly
ce
ns
or
sh
ip
ba
ha
sa
br
as
il
fo
llo
w
er
s
in
sig
n
st
or
ify
op
en
vp
n
in
st
ag
ra
m
gm
ail
iph
on
e
uy
gh
ur
tru
m
p
lin
ke
din
tw
ee
ts
tw
ee
t
io
s
an
dr
oid
yo
ut
ub
e
fa
ce
bo
ok
tw
itt
er
 
Ta
g 
Co
un
t
Fig. 6. Top 75 Descriptive Tags found in Filtered Web Pages
power domains when deriving tags. Figure 7a shows how many
descriptive tags were used to find filtered URLs against the
number of filtered URLs found for each poisoned domain.
Figure 7b shows the same, but with the the Alexa Top 1000
domains removed from the dataset.
Notable examples in Figure 7b are: uyghuramerican.org,
dw.com, hrw.org and eastturkistaninfo.com, all of which
produced “high-power” tags that resulted in a higher number
of filtered URLs than the number URLs crawled for each of
those domains.
E. Limitations of Implementation
There are three main limitations we have identified with our
implementation of this framework. The first is that the act of
filtering may result in search engines being unlikely to list
filtered web pages highly in their rankings due to a lack of
other sites linking to them. Similarly, for smaller websites, it
may be the case that search engines do not rank these highly
enough to be included in our approach. This could be mitigated
by using one or more alternative search engines and combining
the results. However, even given this, we still get good results
when using just a single engine.
A second limitation is the means of checking if a URL is
censored in a particular country. Whilst DNS censorship is
widely practiced it is difficult to know definitively if a web
page is blocked through sole use of this technique. Use of
alternative testing frameworks, such as OONI or ICLab, would
mitigate this limitation significantly and allow for more targeted
testing.
Moreover, there are other, more sophisticated techniques for
detecting blocking that have been published [7][19]. The use
of DNS in our tool is due to its scalability and speed. The
downside of this is that we will not detect if URLs are filtered
by other means.
Finally, we only consider English words when isolating
descriptive tags. This means that a large chunk of potentially
filtered (Chinese) sites are being missed by our tool. A future
version of the system will include Chinese words and phrases
as well as their translation in English.
VI. RELATED WORK
Various pieces of research over recent years have aimed
to detect filtered web resources [33]. A notable example is
CensMon [4] which is is an architecture that can be used as
a censorship monitoring tool for the web. This system uses a
combination of social media, Google Trends and user input
to generate candidate URLs to test for filtering. By taking a
search-based approach, and feeding our results recursively back
into our dataset, our novel use of linguistic patterns as search
queries to link URLs has yielded a list of blocked domains
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Fig. 7. Filtered Domain Discovery
several orders of magnitude larger than CensMon’s reported
results.
The use of DNS as a means for detecting censorship is used
in a study by Wander et al. [34]. They show that a major
advantage of DNS is the fact we can perform the analysis
from outside the target countries by injecting queries into the
networks within them. The authors used this approach to test
for filtered domains within China and Iran. Other country
specific studies conducted for China include [6][7] and for
Iran [9][35].
While our work has focused on discovering filtered URLs,
it is closely related to studies that aim to derive filtered
keywords or phrases. ConceptDoppler, a system proposed
by Crandall et al. [1], attempts to do this for China using
latent semantic analysis on known keyword block lists to
discover semantically related terms that may also be blocked.
While similar, ConceptDoppler is orthogonal to the framework
presented in this paper, since we are focused the discovery and
testing of filtered URLs rather than the keywords themselves,
which is the motivation and focus of ConceptDoppler.
There have also been a number of user-based systems
proposed for detecting Internet filtering, notably UBICA [36]
and work by Winters [37]. These are dependent on volunteers to
gain insight into local networks by either providing information
or running automated probes from within the target countries.
These are fundamentally different approaches to ours since we
conduct all of our analysis from a single location outside the
target networks.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a framework for the automated discovery
of filtered websites without reliance on contextual knowledge or
language specific information. The approach is fully automated,
scalable and effective. Our experiments have demonstrated that
the approach discovers previously unknown filtered content,
which yields further meaningful reults when fed back into itself.
The system does not require complex infrastructure—beyond
pre-existing public services—or significant computational or
network requirements to operate, but instead uses existing
public and cost-effective resources.
Further, this approach does not rely on local knowledge or
participation from individuals in countries of interest, and thus
avoids many significant ethical challenges in building filter lists.
Our technique is limited by the effectiveness of the keyword
mining methods and censorship checking methods. While these
present challenges, our results already demonstrate significant
results with real world application.
The results we have generated are a significant contribution.
Our list of currently poisoned domains within China is far more
up to date and accurate than what is currently available and
we expect to make this available in the near future. We expect
this list to change and grow over time. With the framework
we have proposed, this can be done with minimal effort and
resources. Even with our early results, we present a filter list
of poisoned domains for China that is 30 times larger than the
current most widely-used public list.
Finally, this paper has presented an early analysis using the
data collected through the use of this framework. The ability to
find URLs that can lead to other blocked material is substantial
and has considerably increased the capability for us to monitor
and understand internet censorship.
VIII. FUTURE WORK
The current limitations of the implementation lend them-
selves to easy extension. The most obvious, and important,
of these is to extend the target of the tool to apply to other
states that implement network filtering. Clearly, this requires
integration with methods that allow automated checking of
filtering in other countries beyond China, however, we have
proposed a number of means to do this and are actively pursuing
this potential.
More directly, the tool should be expanded to incorporate
multiple search engines for a more thorough and unbiased view
of the Internet.
The extraction of longer key phrases from filtered URLs as
search terms should be investigated as a means to provide more
specific search results. This could include the use of n-grams or
other, more sophisticated language processing techniques. There
are a number of existing services that can provide functionality
for creating short descriptions from larger bodies of text, or
indeed web pages. These models are usually machine learning
based so could be custom designed for this purpose. Even so,
some existing services are able to leverage large amounts of
data that has been scraped from the Internet.
Finally, incorporating a range of methods for checking the
filtered status of resources, and the use of existing testing
infrastructures such as OONI or ICLab, would greatly increase
the ability of the tool to build comprehensive filtering lists.
Outside, the extensions to the approach, there is significant
scope for additional and more thorough analysis of the data
we have collected. Our database of URLs, descriptive tags and
poisoned domains lends itself to further study and research,
both in the topic of filtered content and in trends in filtering
over time. Additionally, measuring the discovery power of base
domains could give significant insight when trying to discover
patterns of censorship. The work presented here presents a
good starting point for that venture.
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